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Bankruptcy
by Hon. James D. Walker, Jr.*
and Amber Nickell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

No one topic dominated bankruptcy cases arising in the Eleventh
Circuit in 2004, but several developments took center stage. First,
judicial estoppel re-emerged as a tool used to prevent a windfall to the
debtor when the trustee is the real party in interest.' Second, any
benefit accruing to debtors after last year's Supreme Court decision 2 on
state sovereign immunity may have been effectively eliminated by a
recent circuit court decision.' Third, student loan creditors endeavored
to eviscerate the last remnants of the undue hardship discharge by
invoking the availability of the income contingent repayment plan.4
This Article addresses these and other recent developments in bankruptcy law. Where applicable, the Article also points out changes resulting
from the recent enactment of bankruptcy reform.

*

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Middle and Southern Districts of Georgia. Augusta State

University (B.A., 1970); University of South Carolina (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Law Clerk, The Honorable James D. Walker, Jr. Chapman University (B.A., 1993);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. See Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2004); In re
Upshur, 317 B.R. 446, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004); In re Huggins, 305 B.R. 63, 67 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2003).
2. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
3. Ga. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Crow, 394 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2004).
4. See McLaney v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 314 B.R. 228 (Bankr. M.D. Ala.
2004); Educ. Credit Mgt. Corp. v. Boykin, 313 B.R. 516 (M.D. Ga. 2004); Nanton-Marie v.
United States Dep't of Educ., 303 B.R. 228 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003).
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II. PROCEDURE
JudicialEstoppel

A.

In Parker v. Wendy's International, Inc.5 the court of appeals
advanced the seemingly straightforward rule that inconsistent positions
asserted by a debtor in two different proceedings cannot be the basis of
a judicial estoppel defense against the Chapter 7 trustee.' However,
judicial estoppel may be effective against the trustee when the nonbankruptcy recovery exceeds the total amount of claims, costs, and fees in the
Chapter 7 case.7 In Parker the court of appeals acknowledged this
"unlikely scenario" and stated that "perhaps judicial estoppel could be
invoked by the defendant to limit any recovery to only that amount and
prevent an undeserved windfall from devolving on the non-disclosing
debtor."'
In two cases' in which the debtor or trustee sought to reopen the
bankruptcy to assert a previously undisclosed cause of action, the courts
faced the issue of whether the trustee's recovery should be limited.'0
In In re Huggins," the bankruptcy court reopened the case but limited
the trustee's authority to recover to no more than "the amount of the
proofs of claim filed in this case, reasonable attorney fees and reasonable
In contrast, the court in In re Upshur 3 declined to
*.
expenses . .."
make any findings relating to the judicial estoppel defense. Instead, the
court limited its decision to the issue of reopening the bankruptcy
case. 4 All questions relating to judicial estoppel-including, presumably, any limitation on the amount of recovery-were for the nonbankruptcy court to decide. 5
As these cases demonstrate, the circuit court's "unlikely scenario" is
not so unlikely. The cases also show some disagreement among

5. 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
6. Id. at 1271-72. For an overview of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context, see
Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1101, 110408 (2004).
7. See Parker, 365 F.3d at 1273 n.4.
8. Id.
9. In re Upshur, 317 B.R. 446 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004); In re Huggins, 305 B.R. 63
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003).
10.

Id.

11. 305 B.R. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003).
12. Id. at 67.
13. 317 B.R. 446 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004).
14. Id. at 454.
15. Id. at 454 n.5.
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bankruptcy judges about the role of the bankruptcy court in the judicial
estoppel analysis.
B.

Sovereign Immunity

Last year, in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 6 the
Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity cannot be raised as a
defense to the discharge of student loans because such a proceeding is
not a suit within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 7 Instead,
the bankruptcy court's power to discharge such a debt derives from its
in rem jurisdiction over property of the estate. 18 As it turns out, the
decision in Hood may represent an empty victory for debtors. According
to the court of appeals, while a bankruptcy court may discharge an
obligation owed to the state, a bankruptcy court may not be able to
enforce that discharge against the state. 19
In Georgia Higher EducationAssistance Corp. v. Crow (In re Crow),20
debtors filed an adversary proceeding to determine if their student loans
were dischargeable. The complaint included a request for sanctions for
the state's violation of the automatic stay. The issue was whether state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment precluded such
sanctions."' The court said, "[blecause count two seeks affirmative
relief from the state through a coercive judicial process, the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over it is premised on the persona of the state, not on
the res of the debtor's property."22 Thus, the state could raise sovereign
immunity as a defense. However, the defense is only valid if Congress's
attempt to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to § 106(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code23 was ineffective.24 The court, following the majority
of circuits, concluded that Congress has no authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to either Article
125 or the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Consequently, the court ruled
that the debtors' request for sanctions based on a stay violation must be
dismissed.27

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

124 S. Ct. 1905 (2004).
Id. at 1906; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1906.
Id. at 1911 n.4.
394 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 921.
Id. (citations omitted).
11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000).
Crow, 394 F.3d at 921.
U.S. CONST. art. I.
Crow, 394 F.3d at 921-24; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Crow, 394 F.3d at 924.
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Although Crow dealt with a stay violation, the same result will likely
follow from a violation of the discharge injunction. Once the discharge
is entered, no property of the estate exists on which to base in rem
jurisdiction. Thus, any efforts to enforce the injunction would be based
on in personamjurisdiction. Under Crow sovereign immunity bars such
jurisdiction. 8 Thus, while a bankruptcy court can rely on Hood to
discharge a debt owed to the state, Crow prevents any effective
enforcement of that discharge.
C. Venue
According to the decision in Swinney v. Turner,29 a bankruptcy court
lacks the authority to retain a case filed in an improper venue.3" The
debtors in Swinney lived in the Middle District of Alabama but filed
their bankruptcy case in the Middle District of Georgia because the
Georgia bankruptcy court was significantly closer to their home. They
acknowledged the improper venue on their bankruptcy petition. The
bankruptcy court transferred the case on the motion of the trustee and
the debtors appealed, contending that the court could retain the case for
the convenience of the parties. 31
32
The district court examined three provisions of the Judicial Code
relating to bankruptcy in determining that the court has no discretion
Under 28 U.S.C. §
to retain a case filed in an improper venue. 3
34
is domiciled.3 5
where
the
debtor
1408, venue is proper in the district
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1412,36 a district court may transfer a case to a
different venue "in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the
parties."37 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),38 the district court "shall"
dismiss or transfer a case filed in an improper venue. 39 Based on these
provisions, while a court may transfer a case filed in the proper venue
on convenience grounds, "no current statutory provision authorizes a
court to retain a case in an improper venue for the convenience of the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 921.
309 B.R. 638 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 639-40.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a), 1408, 1412 (2000).
Swinney, 309 B.R. at 640.
28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1412 (2000).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000).
Id.
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parties."4' In fact, a provision of the Judicial Code that had allowed
such retention was repealed.4 1
Debtors argued that this scheme, which would allow them to file in
Alabama and then have the case transferred to Georgia, but would not
allow them to file in Georgia, "makes no sense."4 2 While the court
acknowledged that the plain language of the statutes "could lead to
curious (and some may suggest unjust) results," the court implicitly
rejected the assertion that the results were sufficiently absurd to allow
the court to look beyond the statutory text for an alternative interpretation.43 Instead, any "perceived problem" must be remedied by Congress
rather than by the courts. 4
III.

DEBTOR PROTECTIONS

Shell,4"

the court determined that Chapter 7 debtors'
In In re
attorneys who are paid via postdated checks risk running afoul of the
automatic stay and the discharge injunction.46 In Shell the debtor's
attorney accepted, but did not negotiate, payment for his fees via checks
from the debtor that were dated after the date when the bankruptcy
petition was filed.4 7 One circuit court has approved the use of postdated checks to pay Chapter 7 attorney fees under the doctrine of necessity.48 However, in this case, the court followed the majority in holding

that any effort to collect attorney fees post-discharge would violate the
discharge injunction because the attorney fees arise pre-petition and any
effort to collect the attorney fees post-petition violates the automatic
stay.49 Thus, to be paid in full, the Chapter 7 debtor's attorney must
receive all payments-meaning checks must be negotiated-prior to the
date of filing.50

Nevertheless, the court was sympathetic to the

practical problems this procedure creates and urged Congress to
implement a better system for the payment of Chapter 7 debtors'
attorneys. 51

40. Swinney, 309 B.R. at 640.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 641 n.2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1477(a) (repealed 1984).
Swinney, 309 B.R. at 641.
Id.

44. Id.
45.

312 B.R. 431 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004).

46. Id. at 435-36.
47. Id. at 433.
48.
1998)).
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 435 (citing Gordon v. Hines (In re Hines), 147 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 436 n.3.
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IV. BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
A.

Property of the Estate

Timing is everything, especially when determining whether an asset
is property of the estate. In Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell),5 2 the
debtor planted, harvested, and sold certain crops ("2001 crops") prepetition. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy and converted his
Chapter 12 case to Chapter 7, the President signed the Agricultural
Assistance Act,53 which provided disaster payments to farmers who
suffered losses for their 2001 crops. The debtor received a disaster
payment, and the Chapter 7 trustee contended that the payment was
property of the estate. The bankruptcy court found that the payment
was property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) because the debtor had a
pre-petition right to the payment, but not under § 541(a)(6), which deals
with proceeds of estate property.14 The district court affirmed in part
and reversed in part, holding that the crop payments are not property
of the estate under either provision.55
The payments are not property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) because
no interest was created until the legislation was passed.56 Because the
legislation in this case was passed pre-petition and post-conversion, no
57
pre-petition interest existed to become property of the estate.
Similarly, because the entitlement to payment did not arise pre-petition,
the payment itself was not proceeds of estate property. 58
B.

Turnover

Ownership of repossessed collateral is officially different under
Georgia law than under Alabama and Florida law. In Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier),59 the debtor's car was repossessed prepetition, and the debtor sought turnover of the car, as property of the
estate, and sanctions for the creditor's failure to return the car on
demand. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the debtor and the
district court affirmed6.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

322 B.R. 698 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2005).
Pub. L. No. 108-07, 117 Stat. 538, Div. N. Title II (Feb. 20, 2003).
322 B.R. at 702-03.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 709.
376 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1324.
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had previously ruled that under
Alabama and Florida law, a debtor retains only a right of redemption in
a repossessed vehicle, which is not sufficient to bring the vehicle into the
bankruptcy estate.6" After certifying to the Georgia Supreme Court the
question of whether a debtor retains any ownership interest, other than
a right of redemption, in repossessed collateral, the circuit court affirmed
the district court. 2 In Georgia the debtor retains legal title in a vehicle
repossessed pre-petition until the creditor has "complie[d] with the
disposition or retention procedures of the Georgia [Uniform Commercial
Code]." 63 Thus, a creditor who refuses to turn over a repossessed
64
vehicle may be subject to sanctions for violating the automatic stay.
C. Exempt Property
65
1. Individual Retirement Accounts. In Rousey v. Jacoway, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that individual retirement accounts
("IRAs") are exempt from the bankruptcy estate under § 522(d)(10)(E) of
the Bankruptcy Code.66 The debtors had rolled over the balance of
their employee-sponsored pension plans into accounts that qualified as
IRAs under the Internal Revenue Code. When the debtors filed for
bankruptcy, they listed their IRAs as exempt pursuant to § 522(d)(10)
(E), which provides an exemption for a debtor's right to receive "a
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of
service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor."67 The trustee objected to the
exemption, arguing that an IRA is not a "similar plan" to those listed in
§ 522(d)(10)(E) and that the debtors' right to payments from the IRA is
not on account of age.66
The Court first considered whether the right to receive payments from
an IRA is "on account of" age.69 Based on their ordinary meaning, the

61. Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter (In re Kalter), 292 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir.
2002); Lewis v. Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.
1998).
62. Rozier, 376 F.3d at 1324.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 125 S. Ct. 1561 (2005).
66. Id. at 1564. Recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code affirm this decision by
expressly exempting IRAs in newly added § 522(d)(12). Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 224(a)(2).
67. 125 S. Ct. at 1564-65.
68. Id. at 1565.
69. Id. at 1566.
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words "on account of" mean "because of"; in other words, some causal
connection exists.7v In the case of an IRA, the owner suffers a ten
percent tax penalty if he withdraws money prior to reaching fifty-nine
and one half years of age. 7 1 This means the right to receive the full
balance of the account-without having any withheld as a penalty-is
"on account of" age.7 2
Next, the Court considered whether an IRA is "similar" to the plans
described in § 522(d)(10)(E).7 3 To be similar, it "must share characteristics common to the listed plans."7 4 IRAs are similar because, like the
listed plans, their primary purpose is to "provide a substitute for wages"
rather than serving as "mere savings accounts." 5 Consequently, the
Court concluded that IRAs meet all the requirements for exemption. 6
2. Jointly Owned Property. Marriage can be a boon to debtors
trying to exempt real property in Florida and Georgia, even when their
spouses have not filed for bankruptcy. According to the court of appeals
in Musdino v. Sinnreich (In re Sinnreich)," "[property owned by a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor as tenancy by the entireties with a nondebtor under Florida law is not part of the bankruptcy estate and
therefore cannot be reached by creditors." 8 The spouses' rights in the
property are indivisible, and § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code 9
exempts such an interest.8 0 The court rejected the argument that the
special powers to reach such property granted to the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"), pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,8 should be
extended to other creditors.8 2 To do so would render § 522(b)(2)(B)
superfluous."
Turning to Georgia law, the state's homestead exemption, 4 as it
applies to married debtors, has been the subject of some dispute.
Debtors are allowed a $10,000 exemption in their residence, with the

70.

Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1567.
Id.
Id. at 1568.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1571.
391 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1296.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (2000).
Sinnreich, 391 F.3d at 1297.

81.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

82. Sinnreich, 391 F.3d at 1297.
83. Id. at 1298.
84. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
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following exception: "In the event title to the property used for the
exemption provided under this paragraph is in one of two spouses who
85
is a debtor, the amount of the exemption hereunder shall be $20,000."
Courts are split on how to apply this language when the debtor is
separated or divorcing.
In In re Neary,88 the debtor's divorce was pending when she filed her
bankruptcy petition. The debtor had purchased her residence prior to
the marriage, and the residence had always been titled solely in her
name. Relying on the plain language of the statute, the debtor claimed
a homestead exemption of $17,000.87 The bankruptcy court concluded
that the construction of Georgia statutes requires the court to look for
the intent of the legislature and to avoid an absurd result.8" In this
case, the legislature intended "to protect the resident non-debtor spouse's
interest in the property where only one spouse filed for bankruptcy
. .89
The nondebtor spouse did not even have an equitable interest
in the property because it was acquired prior to the marriage.9" For
these reasons the court limited the debtor's exemption to $10,000. 9'
In In re Green,s2 the court took a different approach. 93 In Green the
debtor and his spouse had been separated for twenty years but had not
divorced. They individually owned separate residences, which had been
purchased several years before the bankruptcy filing. The debtor sought
a $20,000 exemption because he was married, was a debtor in bankruptcy, and the residence was titled solely in his name.94 Relying on the
plain language of the statute, the court allowed the exemption.9 5 After
acknowledging that the Georgia Code requires courts to consider
legislative intent when construing statutes, the court found the only
evidence of intent was the language itself.96 The court wrote, "[W]hile
the legislature understandably would not want inadvertent typographical or stylistic errors in the language of statutes to void the meaning of
a statute, neither would it want the courts to reject the natural
consequences of a statute's plain language by characterizing the result

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
No. 03-97808, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 617 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2004).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at **8-9 (citing Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133, 133, 587 S.E.2d 600, 601 (2003)).
Id. at *9.
319 B.R. 913 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004).
Id. at 915-16.
Id. at 914.
Id. at 916-17.
Id. at 915.
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as unintentional."9 7 Thus, because the debtor satisfied the requirements for a $20,000 exemption according to the terms of the statute, the
court allowed such an exemption.98
V.

CLAIMS

A.

Untimely Claims
In In re Hernandez," the IRS did not receive notice of the debtor's
bankruptcy until after the deadline for filing a proof of claim. The IRS
filed a late claim, and the debtor objected.100 The court disallowed the
claim as untimely.'
Under § 502(b)(9) 10 2 a government's claim
must be filed within 180 days of the bankruptcy filing.'0 8 Pursuant to
Rules 3002(c)(1)'0 4 and 9006(b)(3), 10 5 the deadline can only be extended if the extension is sought prior to the expiration of the deadline.106 The court stated that "Congress does not make any exception
to the 180-day deadline for failure to receive notice in a Chapter 13
case." 7 While disallowed claims may be discharged, the court noted
that the IRS is not without remedies, including: (1) stay relief for cause;
(2) dismissal for cause; (3) conversion to Chapter 7; (4) relief from the
confirmation order; (5) revocation of confirmation; and (6) determination
of nondischargeability.° 8
B.

Post-confirmation Objections to Claims
Whether a Chapter 13 debtor may object to a claim after his plan is
confirmed may turn on when he received notice of the claim at issue. In
0 9 the debtor raised post-confirmation objections
In re Shank,1
to credit
card claims. The plan did not state the amount of the claims but did
provide for the full payment of unsecured claims."0 The court noted

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 916.
Id. at 917.
No. 99-13443-BKC-RAM, 2004 WL 962208 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2004).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1, 4.
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2000).
Id.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c)(1) (2000).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3) (2000).
Hernandez, 2004 WL 962208, at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3 n.1.
315 B.R. 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004).
Id. at 801.
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that nothing in the applicable law precludes post-confirmation objections."' In addition, strong policy reasons exist for allowing postconfirmation objections. Notably, efficiency would be greatly hindered
112
if debtors were required to raise objections prior to confirmation.
The confirmation hearing would have to be scheduled after the deadline
for filing claims to prevent the debtor's right to object from being
terminated."' Such a delay in confirmation would result in a corresponding delay in the distribution of payments to creditors."1 4 Furthermore,
(u]ntil the debtor and other parties in the case know that the plan is
confirmed, it often does not make economic sense to spend a lot of time
trying to sort out claims; if the plan is not confirmed and the case is
dismissed .

. .,

all that effort goes down the drain." 5

The court found that its decision did not conflict with the court of
appeals statement in UniversalAmerican Mortgage Co. v. Bateman (In
re Bateman)"6 that an objection to a claim "must be filed prior to
confirmation.""' 7 In Shank the court determined that the plan in
Bateman specified the amount of the creditor's arrearage claim that
differed from the amount set forth in the proof of claim."8 Accordingly, the court's statement in Bateman regarding pre-confirmation
objections was made in the context of holding that the plan cannot be
used as a vehicle for objecting to the claim." 9 The debtor in Bateman
disputed the amount of the claim and should have raised it through an
objection rather than a plan provision. 2 ' Thus, "neither the holding
of Bateman, nor its rationale ... support[s] the2proposition that claims
objections must be filed prior to confirmation."' '

In In re Swanson,122 the court relied on Bateman to reach a different
result. 23 Swanson involved a mortgage claim. The plan provided for
full payment of the claim, including certain post-petition fees. After

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 801-02.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803.
331 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 827.
Shank, 315 B.R, at 804-05.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 808.
307 B.R. 306 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004).
Id. at 307.
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confirmation, the debtor objected to the post-petition fees. 124 The court
found that Bateman prohibited such an objection.'2 5 Under the rule
from Bateman, "a party in interest who fails to raise an objection to a
claim prior to confirmation in a Chapter 11 or 13 case forfeits the right
to object to the claim." 2 ' Nevertheless, the court noted that the
Bateman rule should be limited to those cases in which the debtor has
sufficient notice of the claim prior to confirmation.'27 "The sanctity
and efficacy of a bar date for objections to claims must cede to concerns
of due process when an aggrieved party, in reality, cannot timely object
,,128

VI.

AVOIDANCE

In Barrett Dodge Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Cranshaw (In re Issac
Leaseco, Inc.),129 the court considered the impact of industry standards

in defending a preference action. 3 Defendant sold used cars to the
debtor during the course of a business relationship that had been in
effect for six months. Ten of those sales took place in the ninety days
preceding the bankruptcy filing and were challenged by the trustee as
preferences. Defendant raised the defense that the transfers were made
in the ordinary course of business, which requires evidence that they
were made according to the usual business dealings of the parties and
according to industry standards.'' The bankruptcy court determined
that the industry standard required payment within twenty to forty-five
days after the transfer. Three of the payments at issue were 13made
2
outside that time limit and were avoidable. Defendant appealed.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument that a change in
payment terms is only relevant if it is motivated by the debtor's financial
problems.'3 3 On the contrary, requiring the payment terms to conform
to industry standards provides an objective basis for evaluating selfserving testimony regarding the transactions and it prevents special
dealings done between the parties for the purpose of avoiding a

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
389 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1205-06.
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1210.
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preference action."" In this case, because the parties had been doing
business together for a mere six months, "the bankruptcy court had no
choice but to evaluate their dealings strictly according to industry
standards."'3 5 The expert testimony supported the bankruptcy court's
finding that the standard payment period for the industry was twenty
to forty-five days.'36 The transactions that fell outside that period
were preferences.'3 7
The "ordinary course" defense to a preference action has been changed
somewhat by the bankruptcy amendments. Previously, the creditor had
to prove that the transfer was made according to the usual dealings
between the parties and according to industry standards. 3 ' Under the
new law, the creditor needs to prove only one of these items.3 9
VII.

A.

CONSUMER ISSUES

Dischargeabilityof Debts

1. Student Loans-§ 523(a)(8). 4 ' One of the latest arguments
in the student loan creditor's arsenal is the availability of the income
contingent repayment program ("ICRP"). Most lawyers who graduated
from law school within the past ten years are probably aware of, if not
personally familiar with, this plan. Under the William D. Ford student
loan program,' borrowers have several options for repaying student
These options generally accommodate the reality that
loans. 14 2
earning potential-and ability to repay student loans-increases as
employees gain experience through years in the workforce. The ICRP
sets monthly payments based on income." If income falls below the
poverty level, payments are zero dollars. Any balance remaining after
twenty-five years is cancelled.'"
In Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Boykin (In re Boykin),'4 5
the district court found that the availability of the ICRP is relevant to

134.

Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1210-11.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2000).
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 409.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)-j) (2000); 34 C.F.R. 684 (2004).
34 C.F.R. 685.209 (2004).
Id.
Id.

145.

313 B.R. 516 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
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the good-faith prong of the undue hardship analysis. 146 Because the
debtor's payments under the ICRP would be zero dollars, the court
stated that "it is difficult to conclude that [the debtors] have fully
explored, in good faith, all means of repayment that are reasonably
within their control." 47
However, in Nanton-Marie v. United States Department of Education,148 the court explained that using failure to participate in the
ICRP as a per se bar to discharge is troublesome.' 49 The court determined that "[wihile that program may be available, there is no section
of the Bankruptcy Code that requires it as a condition precedent to an
undue hardship discharge."'50 The court reasoned that the creditor's
position would eliminate any possibility of student loan discharge when
the debtor is eligible for the ICRP.'' The court continued, stating
"'[this cannot be right. The [ICRP] cannot trump the Congressionally
mandated individualized determination of undue hardship. '" 52 The
court further noted that "'even a debtor who pays little or nothing on
student loans under the [ICRP] will carry the every [sic] increasing debt
for the better part of his life, eliminating or severely curtailing the
debtor's ability to incur credit in an increasingly credit driven economy.' '15 As a final blow to the already financially distressed debtor,
any amount cancelled after twenty-five years can result in an income tax
liability. 154
An entirely different issue was raised in McLaney v. Kentucky Higher
Education Assistance Authority (In re McLaney),'5 5 which considered
whether a debtor's charitable contributions may be included in an
analysis of his ability to repay student loans under the first prong of the
undue hardship test. 5 When Congress passed the Religious Liberty

146. Id. at 523. To prove undue hardship, the debtor must show: (1) an inability to
maintain a minimal standard of living if required to repay the student loans; (2) additional
circumstances making the inability to repay likely to persist; and (3) good faith efforts to
repay the loans. Hemar Ins. Corp. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).
147. Boykin, 313 B.R. at 523.
148. 303 B.R. 228 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003).
149. Id. at 235. See also Rutherford v. William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (In re
Rutherford), 317 B.R. 865, 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004).
150. Nanton-Marie, 303 B.R. at 235.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 235-36 (quoting Korhonen v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Korhonen), 296
B.R. 492, 496 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003)).
153. Id. at 236 (quoting Korhonen, 296 B.R. at 496-97).
154. Id.
155. 314 B.R. 228 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004).
156. Id. at 233.
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and Charitable Donation Protection Act 157 in 1998, it amended several
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to protect essentially a debtor's
practice of giving to charity by preventing avoidance of such contributions, by removing such contributions from consideration in the
substantial abuse analysis, and by allowing the contributions to be
considered in a disposable income analysis.15 However, the Act did
nothing to affect the undue hardship analysis of § 523(a)(8).' 59 Courts
have split on the issue, with one line of cases excluding the contributions
from the analysis and a second line of cases allowing the contributions
in appropriate circumstances." 0 In McLaney the court sided with the
second line of cases, stating that "[t]o conclude otherwise would be
tantamount [to] 'writing in' to the statute an exclusion which the statute
does not contain ....,16" The court concluded that charitable giving,
which falls within the scope of § 548(a)(2)162-meaning it either does
not exceed fifteen percent of the debtor's gross annual income or it is
consistent with the debtor's history of giving-should be considered in
the undue hardship analysis." 3
Turning to the second prong of the undue hardship analysis, it
requires the court to determine whether circumstances, in addition to
the debtor's present inability to repay, will prevent repayment of the
student loan in the future." This inquiry does not require the court
to predict the future; it only requires the court to examine existing
circumstances that may affect the future. 165 When those circumstances include a medical disability, the evidence must include "more than the
debtor's testimony as to the existence of the medical condition and its
effect on the debtor's ability to maintain employment .

. . .,,16

Al-

though expert testimony is not necessary, some corroboration is required.
It is worth mentioning that the new bankruptcy law expands the scope
of § 523(a)(8) to include all educational loans, not only government-

157. Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517, 519 (1998).
158. McLaney, 314 B.R. at 235-36.
159. Id. at 236.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 236 n.11.
162. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2000).
163. McLaney, 314 B.R. at 237.
164. Ulm v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 304 B.R. 915, 920 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
165. Id. at 921.
166. Folsom v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Folsom), 315 B.R. 161, 165 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2004).
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The "undue hardship" test, however, remains in

Securities Fraud-§ 523(a)(19). The newest addition to
2.
In
§ 523(a) 169 already survived its first constitutional challenge.
Fishbach v. Simon (In re Simon), 70 the debtor argued that § 523(a)(19)
violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause "to the
extent it incorporates state securities laws." 7' The court rejected this
argument noting that the "Supreme Court has made it clear that the
constitutional requirement for uniformity in bankruptcy laws does not
preclude the Bankruptcy Code from incorporating state laws which...
may lead to different results in different states."1 72

The only bank-

ruptcy provision ever found to violate the uniformity requirement was
a provision that was, in effect, a private bankruptcy law because the
provision applied to a single debtor. 173 Section 523(a)(19) is not a
private bankruptcy law because it "excepts from discharge all debts
resulting from judgments, orders, and settlement agreements arising out
of the violation of state or federal securities laws."'74 The court noted,
with some amusement, that the debtor's outrage over incorporating
differing state laws into the Bankruptcy Code did not extend to Florida's
to the debtor with the
unlimited homestead exemption, which applied
175
laws.
fraud
securities
Florida's
as
force
same
Chapter 13 Plans
A debtor may strip off a wholly unsecured mortgage through his
Chapter 13 plan without making a separate objection to the secured
'
In In re Seranque,'77 both the debtor's proposed plan and
claim. "76
the confirmation notice indicated that the plan sought to value collateral
securing certain claims under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 7 8 The plan valued
the collateral securing the creditor's second mortgage at zero dollars.
After the plan was confirmed, the debtor sought a recordable order

B.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000).
311 B.R. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.
In re Sernaque, 311 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
311 B.R. 632 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
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The creditor opposed the strip

off. 179

The court relied on a court of appeals case to conclude that valuation
of collateral did not require a hearing separate from the confirmation
hearing. 180 Thus, the valuation procedure in this case was proper.""'
The court was left with the question of whether the debtor must raise a
In Universal
claim objection separate from the proposed plan."2
American Mortgage Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman),'8 3 the circuit
court concluded that a plan provision reducing the amount of the
creditor's arrearage claim was no substitute for a pre-confirmation
objection to the claim."l 4 The bankruptcy court distinguished Bateman
because the debtor in that case was using the plan to change the amount
of the claim.18 In Seranque the debtor used the plan for "valuation of
the collateral securing the claim, a separate and distinct issue."8 6 So
long as the creditor receives notice that the plan will value the collateral,
no separate objection to the claim is required.8 7 Once the plan is confirmed, the valuation binds the creditor.'
VIII.
A.

CHAPTER 11

Alter-ego Actions

In Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson (In re Icarus Holding, LLC),'89
the debtor's principal misused the debtor's assets. Consequently, a
creditor asserted an alter-ego claim against the principal. However, the
debtor contended that the alter-ego claim was property of the estate and
entered into an agreement to settle the claim. The principal sought to
enjoin any further alter-ego actions brought by individual creditors. The
issue was whether the alter-ego claim was property of the estate, which
would give the debtor the exclusive right to assert the claim.190 The

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Sernaque, 311 B.R. at 635.
Id. at 636-37 (citing In re Calvert, 907 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 637.
Id.
331 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 828.
Sernaque, 311 B.R. at 638.
Id. at 639.
Id. (citing Calvert, 907 F.2d at 1072).
Id. at 641.
391 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1318.
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bankruptcy court found that the alter-ego claim was property of the
estate, and the district court affirmed; the creditor appealed.'
According to the circuit court, whether an alter-ego claim is property
of the estate depends on the following factors: (1) whether the claim is
"a general claim common to all creditors," and (2) whether state law will
permit a corporation to pierce its own veil.1 9 2 The court determined
that the claim was general because the principal looted the debtor's
assets.193 In such circumstances, any creditor could sue the princiHowever, on the second part of the test, the court determined
pal.'
the law was muddled.'9 5 The state courts have never directly addressed the issue of whether a corporation can pierce its own veil, and
the bankruptcy courts that had considered the issue reached different
results. 96 Thus, the court certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the
following questions: "(1) Will Georgia law allow the representative of a
debtor corporation to bring an alter ego claim against the corporation's
former principal? (2) If so, what is the measure of recovery?" 9 ' The
Georgia Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative-essentially approving the district court ruling. 98 On the second
question, the court said the liability is the full amount of the corporation's debt.'99 A final ruling from the Eleventh Circuit is pending.
B.

Dismissal

According to the court in State Street Houses, Inc. v. New York State
Urban Development Corp. (In re State Street Houses, Inc.),2"' the
factors set forth in In re Phoenix Picadilly2' continue to be the proper
test for determining whether a single-asset real estate Chapter 11 case
has been filed in bad faith.2 °2 The court rejected arguments that
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code-particularly 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)

191. Id.
192. Id. at 1319-20.
193. Id. at 1321.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1321-22.
197. Id. at 1322.
198. Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, No. S05Q0587, 2005 WL 949253, at *4 (Ga. Apr.
26, 2005).
199. Id. at *5.
200. 356 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2004).
201. 849 F.2d 1393 (11th Cir. 1988). See also In re Albany Partners, 749 F.2d 670(11th
Cir. 1984).
202. In re Pheonix Picadilly, 849 F.2d at 1393.
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(3)2 0 3 -legislatively overruled Phoenix Piccadilly and held that the
guidelines "have not been modified by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994. "204
C.

Exemption of Stamp Tax

Section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code 20 5 provides that a transfer
made under a Chapter 11 plan is not subject to a stamp or similar
tax. 6 In FloridaDepartment of Revenue v. TH. Orlando, Ltd. (In re
TH. Orlando),2 7 the debtor had to obtain refinancing for its hotels in
order to confirm its plan. 20 ' A lender agreed to provide the financing
only on the condition that a hotel owned by a nondebtor third party was
also included in the financing package. The nondebtor agreed. The
issue was whether the transfer relating to the nondebtor was exempt
from Florida's documentary stamp tax, which required the court to
construe the meaning of the phrase "under a plan."" 9 The court
adopted the view of the other circuit courts to consider the issue, and the
court held that a "transfer 'under a plan' refers to a transfer authorized
by a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. In turn, a plan authorizes any transfer
that is necessary to the consummation of the plan."21" Thus, any
transfer necessary to consummation of the plan-even one involving
nondebtors-is exempt from the stamp tax.211
The court rejected the argument that the exemption was an improper
"adjudication of a third party's tax liability," which is outside the scope
of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.2 12 On the contrary, the court is
only determining the applicability of a provision of the Bankruptcy
Code. 2" The court wrote, "[I]f bankruptcy courts were divested of
jurisdiction in any case in which a state sought to impose a stamp tax
or similar tax on a nondebtor, states could circumvent the exemption
provided under § 1146(c) by shifting the tax burden entirely to third
parties ....2 4

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2000).
State Street Houses, 356 F.3d at 1347.
11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (2000).
Id.
391 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1289-90.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

On April 20, 2005, the sleeping giant of bankruptcy reform was finally
awakened when President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 into law.21 The bulk of the
legislation, including its centerpiece-means testing-becomes effective
on October 17, 2005.
As the courts and practitioners begin operating under the new law, the
Supreme Court will take up an old issue: abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.216 In 2004 the Court considered the issue in Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,217 but avoided reaching a conclusion
by deciding the case on other grounds. Hood raised a student loan
dischargeability issue, and the Court held that bankruptcy courts had
in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt.2" ' In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz (In re Wallace's Bookstore),1 9 the trustee is seeking
to recover preferential transfers made to the state. In Hood the Court
expressly distinguished a dischargeability proceeding from "an adversary
proceeding by the bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover property in the
hands of the State on the grounds that the transfer was a voidable
preference." 2 ° Because Wallace's Bookstore presents the exact issue
referenced in Hood, the Court is unlikely to dodge the issue of sovereign
immunity a second time.

215. Pub. L. No. 109-8.
216. Central Va. Community College v. Katz (In re Wallace's Bookstore), 125 S. Ct.
1727 (2005).
217. 124 S. Ct. 1905 (2004).
218. Id. at 1912-13.
219. 125 S. Ct. 1727 (2005).
220. 124 S. Ct. at 1914.

